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MONEY, MOTIVATION, AND TERRORISM
 Attempting to neutralize terrorists is a vexing problem� Terrorists are elusive: they emerge to commit acts of terror, then blend back into their environment� 
Frequently they are lone individuals who travel freely, do not wear uniforms, and 
assiduously seek to avoid detection� Governments historically have employed 
a hard/soft-power approach to the problem: targeting terrorists through direct 
action (counterterrorism units, drone strikes, etc�), while employing soft-power 
mechanisms either to gain information or to create an environment that is less 
conducive to facilitating, supporting, and encouraging acts of terror�
The most recent significant terrorist attack against the United States—the 
attack on the U�S� mission in Benghazi, Libya—provides a useful illustration of 
the classic hard/soft approach� In the immediate 
wake of the attack, the United States deployed to 
the region agents of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI), the U�S� European Command Fleet 
Antiterrorism Security Team Platoon, two Navy 
warships, drones, and other military capabilities� 
Shortly after that, the United States offered a ten-
million-dollar reward for information leading to 
the capture of those responsible for the attack on 
the mission�1
The U�S� Department of State (DOS) offered the 
reward under the Rewards for Justice (RFJ) pro-
gram, which it has called “one of the most valuable 
assets the U�S� government has in the fight against 
international terrorism�”2 Together, RFJ and the 
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U�S� Department of Defense (DoD) rewards program have paid more than two 
hundred million dollars to informants since 1984�
Despite these programs’ size and scope and our reliance on them, they re-
ceive a surprising lack of scrutiny or attention from the media, academia, and 
the government�3 Indeed, no government or research entity ever has evaluated 
or even questioned the efficacy of these programs� While this fact is surprising 
on its own, it is downright astonishing given that a significant body of psychol-
ogy research demonstrates that extrinsic rewards structures—such as those that 
underlie these rewards programs—can undermine motivation and thus prove 
counterproductive� To structure rewards programs better, the rewarder must 
appreciate the relationship between the award and information: why and when 
people are motivated to provide useful information� With this in mind, rewards 
programs can be restructured to motivate potential informants more effectively, 
achieving far better results at a much reduced cost�
This article then has three goals� The first is to highlight both the importance 
of rewards programs and the lack of critical attention they have received� The 
second is to review the implementation of current rewards programs through 
two heretofore unused lenses: research into the psychology of motivation, and 
the historical case study provided by what the British experienced during what 
they called the “Malayan Emergency�” Finally, this article introduces two sugges-
tions for structuring rewards programs better� These approaches, termed here 
maximizing and minimizing, seek to provide readily implementable improve-
ments that apply historical lessons, together with guidance taken from years of 
academic research on motivation�
THE EXISTING REWARDS PROGRAM
Background
The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism established the RFJ program�4 
The DOS Bureau of Diplomatic Security manages the program, which permits 
the Secretary of State to authorize “rewards for information that leads to the ar-
rest or conviction of anyone who plans, commits, aids, or attempts international 
terrorist acts against U�S� persons or property, that prevents such acts from oc-
curring in the first place, that leads to the location of a key terrorist leader, or that 
disrupts terrorism financing�”5
Rewards can be up to U�S�$25 million, or more if the Secretary of State “deter-
mines that a greater amount is necessary to combat terrorism or to defend the 
United States against terrorist acts�”6 Since 1984, the program has put up more than 
two hundred million dollars in rewards and has paid out more than $125 million�
The DoD rewards program allows the Secretary of Defense to pay rewards for 
nonlethal assistance that benefits the U�S� armed forces�7 The standard operating 
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procedure referred to as Money as a Weapons System implements the DoD pro-
gram, which provides smaller rewards in greater numbers than RFJ�8 Many other 
countries, including Afghanistan, Argentina, China, Greece, Guinea, Kenya, 
Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, offer similar 
rewards programs for assistance against those designated as terrorists�
Judging Program Effectiveness
There has never been an evaluation of the effectiveness of either U�S� program� 
DOS long has maintained that RFJ is both successful and effective� On the pro-
gram’s web page, administrators state that the program has “provided informa-
tion that has helped prevent or favorably resolve acts of international terrorism 
against U�S� interests and bring to justice some of the world’s most notorious 
terrorists�”9 This statement is true; then again, twenty-five-million-dollar rewards 
have failed, and in some cases continue to fail, to lead to the capture of Saddam 
Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed�10 Further, multimillion-dollar rewards have failed to 
produce information on virtually any major terrorist attack on the United States, 
stretching from the Benghazi attack (2012) back through the attack on USS Cole 
(2000), the bombings of the U�S� embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (1998), the 
bombing of the Khobar Towers (1996), the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 (1986), 
the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 830 
(1982)�11
So, determining whether RFJ is a “successful” program depends on the met-
ric of success used� Perhaps generating a single piece of information would be 
deemed successful; researchers at the European Organization for Nuclear Re-
search (known as CERN) spent an estimated $13�25 billion to discover a single 
Higgs boson elementary particle—by all accounts, a successful effort�12
In the context of rewards programs, however, a far more important metric is 
the efficiency of the program� Consider the following example: a terrorist bomb 
injures two U�S� citizens� If the U�S� government offered a ten-million-dollar re-
ward and received information leading to capture of the terrorists, the rewards 
would be successful—but not necessarily effective� If a one-million-dollar reward 
generated the same information, it would be both successful and more effective� 
Or consider a rewards program that produces one hundred pieces of information, 
but could produce five hundred pieces of information if its administration were 
changed slightly�
The goal of any rewards program should be increased efficiency: more in-
formation at a lower cost� Increasing efficiency requires first understanding a 
program’s costs�
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Valuing Rewards Programs: The Cost of Information
Conducting an objective, academically rigorous evaluation would be the best 
method for understanding the costs and benefits of the programs� Interestingly, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted evaluations of re-
wards and incentives for federal employees, tax whistle-blowers, and those who 
report Medicare and Medicaid fraud�13 The GAO report on incentivizing federal 
employees provides useful guidance for evaluating the combined DOS/DoD 
rewards program� The report notes that “[a]gencies that fail to evaluate their in-
centive programs have no basis for determining whether their programs actually 
motivate and reward employee high performance�”14
In any rewards program, the actual reward paid is the largest and most obvi-
ous cost of the program� RFJ has paid out more than $125 million in rewards� In 
exchange, the U�S� government has received information� Was the information 
worth more than $125 million? Would it have been worth a billion dollars? Or 
perhaps “only” one million? Might the information have been provided for free?
When information is received through a rewards program, the government 
often presumes that the program motivated the informant� However, informants 
may act out of a sense of patriotism, personal animus, or some other motivation 
that we falsely attribute to the reward� In such cases, a reward would be “wasted,” 
as the individuals would have come forward for a much smaller reward, or per-
haps none at all� Without understanding what motivates an individual to come 
forward with information, it is impossible to fix an efficient price (the amount of 
the reward) for what the government is purchasing (information)�
Absent objective valuations, officials must resort to subjective valuations; what 
makes Ayman al-Zawahiri “worth” twenty-five million dollars and Mullah Omar 
“worth” ten million dollars remains unclear� Government officials have indicated 
that there is an internal process that establishes these numbers; but given the 
suspiciously round reward figures, the valuation is at least somewhat subjective�
Beyond the actual cost of the reward, ancillary costs must be considered� The 
majority of RFJ targets are thought to be located in predominantly war-torn, 
rural, impoverished areas�15 Injecting large sums of cash into such regions has 
the potential to cause any number of unintended consequences� Most obviously, 
rewardees or others could use the money to perpetuate violence by purchasing 
weapons or funding violent operations that will destabilize the region further� 
Conversely, the rewardee may become a target for revenge or robbery� The DoD 
program guidance expressly discusses this possibility�16 A broader negative im-
plication of a large reward is its destabilizing impact on the local economy� In 
theory, these unintended outcomes are more likely in some regions than others� 
Accordingly, rewards programs should take into account the recipient’s location�
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There also exists the possibility that the offer of a reward could bolster the 
reputations of wanted individuals, inflating their standing among associates and 
possibly in the broader community, and bringing them greater support (money, 
personnel, and equipment)� Thus, the reward may exacerbate the problem it is 
seeking to resolve� Some, for example, believe that offering a reward for the cap-
ture of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi increased his reputation�17 DoD has recognized 
this possibility, noting in its reward program guidance that “lower rewards limit 
notoriety for insurgents (Jesse James effect)�”18
A rewards program also may embolden or anger the target of the reward� For 
instance, in 1975 members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) assassinated Ross 
McWhirter (a cofounder of the Guinness Book of World Records) three weeks after 
he offered a reward for information leading to the arrest of members of the IRA� 
One of the killers, after his release in 1999, noted that McWhirter “put a bounty 
on our heads� He asked for it�”19 Poor rewards program execution can lead to such 
blowback�
Finally, it is instructive to look at the GAO report on incentivizing federal 
employees, which identifies several problems with rewards programs, including 
concerns regarding the possibility of fostering negative internal competition�20 A 
poorly structured or advertised program can even result in program failure� The 
FBI, for instance, pulled an advertising campaign for RFJ in the Seattle area fol-
lowing widespread complaints that the campaign promoted stereotypes�21
The true cost of a rewards program, then, is the cost of the reward plus the 
cost of any follow-on effects of the program such as increasing violence; bolster-
ing enemy reputations; angering enemies, thereby incentivizing their actions; 
and fostering negative competition for information� The very idea that a rewards 
program could have negative implications is anathema to the DOS view of its 
program, which is that as long as information is coming in, the program is work-
ing� Yet such costs are very real and should be considered when structuring re-
wards programs� This was one of the lessons the British learned in their Malayan 
rewards program�22
THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY:  
A REWARDS-FOR-INFORMATION CASE STUDY
Governments long have offered monetary rewards in exchange for beneficial 
information or action� Letters of marque—essentially licenses for private indi-
viduals to capture enemy ships, rewarded from the sale of booty—date from as 
early as 1295�23 Similarly, in the sixteenth century countries began formalizing 
the concept of prize money—at first, money paid to crews for capturing a wanted 
pirate�24 Rewards for information on terrorists are a more recent development� 
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One of the earliest references relating to rewards for information for capturing 
what the British termed terrorists comes from the Malayan Emergency�
The Malayan Emergency traces its origins to the establishment of the South 
Seas (Nanyang) Communist Party in 1925; the organization was renamed the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930�25 The party, comprising primarily 
ethnic Chinese, garnered widespread popular support after Japan’s invasion of 
Malaya in 1942� The MCP established the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army 
(MPAJA), which the United Kingdom and the United States officially recognized 
as the “foremost resistance organization behind the Japanese lines�”26 At the end 
of the war, the MPAJA “had established de facto control of many areas�”27 The 
British sought to control MPAJA forces by placing them under British military 
command—paying, clothing, and otherwise providing for all MPAJA forces� By 
1946, however, relations between the British and the MCP were collapsing rap-
idly�28 In February 1948, the communists—now styling themselves the Malayan 
Races Liberation Army—launched a series of major labor strikes, followed by a 
terror campaign, and eventually an insurgency that became protracted�29
The British initially responded with military force, but shifted to a whole-of-
government approach with the implementation of what was called the Briggs 
Plan, named after British lieutenant general Sir Harold Briggs, the commander 
of British forces� The overall intent of the plan was to cut off the insurgents from 
their support base�30 While the plan was, at its essence, a population-control pro-
gram, a major component of the program was a psychological warfare campaign, 
with an associated rewards program�31 Briggs enlisted the assistance of Hugh 
Carleton Greene, whose mission was “to persuade the terrorists to surrender, 
disrupting their organization and spreading disaffection in the process, and to 
encourage the civilian population to oppose them�”32
Before Greene arrived, the British had attempted—disastrously—an amnesty 
plan and were contemplating a rewards program�33 Greene conducted a cultural 
assessment of the communist fighters and their sympathizers and found that—
ironically—they were motivated by “greed�”34 Greene recognized that properly 
targeting the motivation could incentivize peasants to provide information, and 
those recruits tired of the jungle lifestyle to quit� In December 1950, Greene se-
cured funding for large increases in the size of rewards� In March 1952, Briggs’s 
successor, Sir Gerald Templer—who is thought to have coined the phrase “hearts 
and minds”—further increased the size of the rewards�35
Large reward size was one factor that made the Malaya rewards program suc-
cessful� Rewards ranged from three times the average Malayan worker’s annual 
income to as much as eighty-five times the annual figure� In one example from 
1956, an informant who supplied information that led to the ambush of three 
terrorists received an award equivalent to seventeen years of pay�36 By contrast, in 
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2010 the gross domestic product per capita in Iraq was $6,594, yet the vast major-
ity of rewards under the DoD program are below ten thousand dollars� Granted, 
there are complications with advertising very large rewards (discussed later in 
the article), but both the British in Malaya and the Americans in Iraq recognized 
the problem�
While the size of the reward the British paid was important, so too was the 
structure of the program: it provided rewards for nearly everything and every-
body� The program paid rewards both for surrenders and for information leading 
to captures�37 Personnel who surrendered were rewarded at a rate commensurate 
with their importance; for instance, a surrendering platoon leader might receive 
double the reward provided to a surrendering platoon sergeant� Informants who 
provided information leading to the capture of a wanted person were given a 
reward equal to 75 percent of the “surrender value” of the person� Further, vol-
untarily surrendered insurgents who provided information still were provided 
rewards, but at a 50 percent discount on their “surrender value�”38
The program proved extraordinarily successful� In 1953, for instance, 372 
insurgents surrendered, compared with only seventy-three captured�39 During 
the entirety of the program, 2,702 insurgents surrendered, compared with only 
1,287 captured�40 Seventy percent of defectors cited the program as having influ-
enced their decisions to defect� This number, a RAND study notes, “leaves out 
of account those who were captured, wounded, or killed on the basis of defector 
intelligence� It also ignores the profound effect which surrenders had on morale 
in the insurgents’ camps�”41
What can the Malayan Emergency tell us with regard to modern rewards pro-
grams? Among other lessons, three are particularly instructive� First is the pro-
gram’s recognition that “large public bounties on the heads of terrorist leaders, 
coupled with their continued immunity from the government, were inadvertently 
turning them into objects of hero worship among the rank and file�” So British 
authorities stopped advertising maximum rewards; instead they announced base 
reward amounts, with the provision that the reward could be much higher�42
The second lesson learned is that rewards can generate or encourage vigilante 
justice—a rewards program is a modern-day “Wanted Dead or Alive” campaign�43 
While this would be a valid critique of the Malayan rewards program, both the 
DoD and DOS rewards programs are limited by statute to “nonlethal” assistance�44
Finally, the British program highlighted the “blood on the hands” issue� 
Should a reward be paid to an individual who has participated in acts of terrorism 
or violence? If so, is there a limit to the acceptable level of violence? For instance, 
what if, in 2002, Ayman al-Zawahiri had offered to give up Osama Bin Laden? 
The answers to such questions likely are situation dependent� The British in 
Malaya struggled with this question, modifying their position several times over 
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the course of the program� One commentator summarized the moral quandary 
as follows:
[T]o the soldiers on the ground it seemed almost surreal that “terrorists who were 
caught were treated like murderers, while those who surrendered were ‘treated like 
kings�’” That this dilemma was keenly felt by the men on the spot cannot be over-
emphasized� Many argued that it was morally indefensible that a man caught with a 
truckload of supplies intended for the terrorists could be prosecuted and sentenced to 
death, whereas a terrorist with “several brutal murders to his discredit” could decide 
to surrender, “walk out of the jungle and get a job�”45
Reasoning that anything that brought the war to a faster conclusion was morally 




A rewards program constitutes a government attempting to entice a person to 
do something (provide information assistance) in exchange for an incentive 
(money)� Understanding a person’s motivation allows the rewarding government 
to aim its rewards programs better, such that they produce the maximum amount 
of information for the minimal cost� Hugh Greene, for example, understood that 
the Malayan insurgents were motivated by money, and he structured the British 
program accordingly�
Psychologists generally categorize motivation as either internal or external�47 
Intrinsic motivation is internal—it arises from within the individual�48 External 
motivation is the result of outside pressures on the individual, such as rewards 
and punishments�49 An intrinsically motivated person receives satisfaction from 
the activity itself, whereas the externally motivated person receives satisfaction 
from the result�50
Rewards programs are external motivations designed to encourage action 
(providing information) toward the desired outcome� While the desired outcome 
is easy to understand, it is devilishly difficult to predict the behaviors that will 
lead to that outcome—and, by extension, the incentives that will encourage these 
behaviors� Many rewards programs target complex environments in which myr-
iad internal and external motivations may be in play� Misidentifying motivations 
for providing information can render a rewards program ineffective quickly�
Studies by psychologists in the early 1970s were “the first of many to illustrate 
the paradox that extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation�”51 The 
relationship between reward and motivation, however, is exceedingly complex� 
When the reward is external to the activity, for instance, numerous studies have 
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found that “using an extrinsic reward to motivate someone to do something that 
the person would have done anyway could have detrimental effects on the quality 
and creativity of the person’s performance and on the person’s subsequent moti-
vation to perform the activity once the extrinsic reward was received�”52 External 
rewards can cause people to “lose touch with their natural interests, psychological 
needs, and intrinsic satisfactions�”53
Edward Deci and Richard Ryan published a seminal paper on the subject in 
1985� In it they argue that, in instances where “the primary significance of [the] 
event for [the rewardee] is that it conveys [the rewardee is] being controlled,” it 
will “decrease [the rewardee’s] subsequent motivation�”54 This paper generated 
a flood of studies and papers reaching varying conclusions� A comprehensive 
review of the research in 1996 concluded that “(1) the detrimental effects of re-
wards occur under highly restricted, easily avoidable conditions; (2) mechanisms 
of instrumental and classical conditioning are basic for understanding incremen-
tal and detrimental effects of reward on task motivation; and (3) positive effects 
of rewards on performance are easily attainable using procedures derived from 
behavioral theory�”55
Deci and Ryan formulated their work into a theory they dubbed cognitive 
evaluation theory, which holds that “events that negatively affect a person’s au-
tonomy or competence diminish intrinsic motivation, whereas events that sup-
port perceived autonomy and competence enhance intrinsic motivation�”56 Again 
conducting a meta-analysis of their theory and its scholastic progeny, Deci and 
Ryan concluded that “tangible rewards made contingent on task behavior tend 
to be experienced as controlling and to undermine intrinsic motivation�”57 The 
solution is to structure rewards that “minimize the control in the situation by 
making the rewards nonsalient, by using an autonomy-supportive interpersonal 
style, and by highlighting competence clues�”58
Surprisingly, the research that Deci and his colleagues conducted came up 
with findings that were even more unexpected with regard to the person provid-
ing the reward� In a study of teachers and students and the effects of rewards on 
performance, the researchers found that teachers who endorsed the concept of 
rewards for performance had a negative effect on their students’ performance� 
The researchers found that other measures of external control (e�g�, grades) were 
“highly detrimental to � � � self-motivation�” A further conclusion was that where 
external mechanisms (e�g�, grades) were motivating, they often motivated the 
wrong behavior (e�g�, a desire to get a good grade as opposed to a desire to master 
the material)�59
Deci, Ryan, and others also have conducted a great deal of research on the 
separate but related issue of intrinsic versus extrinsic aspirations� RFJ and all 
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similar rewards programs presume that the rewards offered (money) will moti-
vate persons to provide information� These programs offer, in effect, a promise 
to fulfill what Deci refers to as the “American Dream”—where “wealth and fame 
are believed to produce happiness and well-being�”60 Unsurprisingly, this may not 
be the desired end state for everyone� The research suggests that “overinvestment 
in the extrinsic ‘having’ goals may be harmful to, rather than the foundation 
for, well-being and life satisfaction�”61 This phenomenon appears to have cross-
cultural application� Deci, Ryan, and others argue that “intrinsic pursuits such as 
relatedness, growth, and community are likely to directly satisfy basic psycho-
logical needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence[,] � � � [while] placing 
heavy emphasis on pursuit of extrinsic goals and rewards such as money � � � can 
provide only indirect satisfaction of these basic needs and may actually distract 
from or interfere with their fulfillment�”62
Identifying the importance of intrinsic motivation is only half the equation; 
it is equally important to understand how to structure a rewards program to 
target intrinsic motivation� With regard to the latter, there are, of course, various 
schools of thought� Adherents of cognitive evaluation theory hold that “intrinsic 
motivation springs from two innate sources (the need for competence and the 
need for self-determination)�”63
The psychologist Abraham H� Maslow provides another perspective� Maslow 
theorized that humans are driven by wants and needs—specifically, unsatisfied 
needs�64 Satisfied needs, Maslow argued, do not motivate behavior� Maslow or-
ganized all needs in a hierarchy and theorized that the needs at each level must 
be satisfied in full before the individual will be motivated by higher-order needs� 
At the base level are physiological needs (breathing, food, water, etc�), followed 
by safety (of self, family, food, property, etc�), love (friendship, family), esteem 
(confidence, achievement, respect, etc�), and finally self-actualization�65 In other 
words, if a person is starving, his or her entire motivation for action will be to 
satisfy that unsatisfied need�
Interestingly, a study of the U�S�–South Vietnamese rewards program Chieu 
Hoi found that the program attracted defectors, “since it provided for all their 
needs such as shelter, food, medical care, clothing, and also saved them from 
the threat of the US army�”66 Soldiers, Vietcong or otherwise, are not motivated 
by other needs until these fundamental needs are met� Once that level of need is 
satisfied, the individual is motivated by subsequent unfulfilled needs at higher 
levels of the hierarchy� Unsurprisingly, a RAND study of the British rewards-for-
information program in the Malayan Emergency found that “[u]ntil the govern-
ment could provide a defector or informer the protection he needed, the program 
got nowhere�”67
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Motivating Informants
Applying Maslow’s model to a rewards paradigm produces some interesting 
insights� Take, for example, a farmer living in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas who knows the location of Sirajuddin Haqqani and the existence of a 
reward for him� The farmer realizes that his life will be upended if he provides the 
information about Haqqani—doing so has the potential to disrupt his hierarchy of 
needs� Being a rational person, the farmer will weigh that potential cost (disrup-
tion) against the benefits of providing the information (cash)� A cash reward can 
provide for the basic needs (e�g�, food, water, shelter, clothing)� Then the farmer 
will consider his other needs, specifically his personal and financial security�
Here is where the current rewards systems break down� The farmer recognizes 
that his personal security will be threatened once he provides information against 
the Taliban—a concern that will be heightened if he is paid an in-kind reward 
(e�g�, a new goat suddenly shows up on his doorstep)� He quickly realizes that a 
reward cannot guarantee physical security, so his only realistic option would be 
to move away� The DoD rewards program acknowledges this problem, noting in 
the case of Iraq that “[l]arge reward amounts for the Iraqi people primarily pro-
vide an expeditious means to leave the country, and an average citizen and their 
family are at risk if they come into a sizeable amount of U�S� dollars�”68 Moving 
away, however, would disrupt the farmer’s familial relationships and his sense of 
belonging in the community� His attention then will shift to whether and how a 
reward can fill these unsatisfied hierarchical needs� Current rewards programs 
provide nothing in this regard; not only do they fail to fulfill an informant’s 
unsatisfied needs, but they have the potential to disrupt needs that currently are 
fulfilled�
Another interesting case study is the Taliban foot soldier living day to day in 
the same camp as Sirajuddin Haqqani� How can a rewards program incentivize 
him? Or, viewed another way, what is motivating the soldier not to provide in-
formation? To answer this question, it can be instructive to look at what put the 
foot soldier in the camp in the first place� To recruit a member successfully, the 
Taliban must be able at a minimum to convince him that it can satisfy his basic 
needs (e�g�, food, water, and shelter)� If the recruit is truly destitute and starving, 
this may be the only motivation he needs� The Taliban offers further incentives 
to motivate behavior, such as a sense of belonging, friendship, recognition, self-
esteem, and even the prospect of self-actualization�
To motivate the foot soldier to give up his comrade, friend, or leader or to quit 
the Taliban, the rewarding agent must be able to satisfy these needs of the reward 
recipient that suddenly no longer will be fulfilled once he takes action against the 
Taliban� In a study of the Chieu Hoi program, researchers found that the reasons 
cited most frequently for defecting were “the physical hardships, the economic 
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needs of the family back home, the desire to evade criticism or punishment, fear 
of death, and homesickness�”69 The British in Malaya distributed “thousands of 
leaflets carrying photographs showing healthy-looking [former insurgents], ap-
parently happy and reunited with their families�”70
In contrast, the U�S� programs, as currently structured, fail to satisfy even the 
most basic need of personal safety� Proponents of the program would argue that 
the cash payment allows the recipient to move to ensure his and his family’s secu-
rity� This argument assumes they have the ability and desire to travel� There also 
may be physical, bureaucratic, and political impediments (e�g�, health, passports, 
visas, finding a new home country that will take them) that would prevent such 
individuals from traveling� But even assuming a rewardee and his family can and 
will travel, when they move away from their community the hierarchical needs 
that community formerly supplied (love, esteem, achievement, etc�) no longer 
will be fulfilled�
Like the hypothetical farmer, the foot soldier is a rational actor who will weigh 
the benefits and costs of providing the information� Unless the reward can miti-
gate the disruption to his hierarchy of needs, the reward will do little to motivate 
him� With regard to awards, Professor John Esposito has noted that “[y]ou have 
to be sure that people are protected � � � , because in order for the system to work 
well, there should be complete anonymity�”71
It is worth noting that Maslow’s theory does not apply perfectly to this subject� 
Organizations rooted in religious doctrine have the capacity to attract adherents 
who are willing to forgo basic needs in exchange for self-actualization� A monk, 
for example, may be willing to forgo physical comfort and secular community 
acceptance in a quest for spiritual fulfillment� Al Qaeda may attract individuals 
willing to forgo the fulfillment of basic needs such as physical safety in exchange 
for self-actualization (i�e�, martyrdom)� Maslow’s hierarchy provides little guid-
ance about how to motivate such individuals�
Yet despite the gaps in Maslow’s theory, it provides a relevant and useful illus-
tration of a fundamental point: in most instances, money alone will not motivate 
people to provide information if their personal safety cannot be guaranteed�
On the broader point of applying psychological models to the structuring of 
rewards programs: no model can provide the details� Even if one accepts that 
rewards must address hierarchies of needs, those needs are very situation de-
pendent� Consider two hypotheticals� In the first, the informant is a U�S�/Afghan 
citizen whose family lives in the United States; in the second, the informant is 
an Afghan citizen whose family lives in Afghanistan� The needs of these two 
individuals are different� Similarly, programs have to be adapted to the cultural 
environment in which they are implemented� Wisely, the DoD rewards program 
in Afghanistan is based on Afghan culture�72
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Program Models
Minimizing the Reward Profile. Given the issues addressed above, consider-
ation should be given to approaches that address these issues� The first approach 
would seek to provide rewards in a way that minimizes the conspicuousness of 
the reward� A minimized-profile rewards approach provides the dual benefits of 
reducing threats to an informant’s safety and reducing the appearance of con-
trol, to avoid undermining intrinsic motivation� Various methods are available 
to minimize a reward’s profile� For instance, rather than soliciting information 
from individuals, information can be solicited from and rewards paid through 
organizations (neighborhoods, companies, government agencies), with the or-
ganization reaping the benefits collectively in the form of in-kind rewards�
Providing rewards across a large organization significantly reduces the threat 
of retribution, thereby reducing individual members’ concerns for their safety� 
Naturally, under this reward paradigm, the organization as an entity will reap a 
greater short-term reward than the individual members of the organization; the 
owners of a factory, for instance, benefit from a new piece of equipment� The 
long-term benefit, however, accrues to everyone: a more productive business 
leads to economic stability and long-term security�
Another method would be to provide rewards in the form of annuitized pay-
ments� Rather than being paid in a lump sum that would increase scrutiny on 
the informant, the reward would come in small payments over a long span of 
time (e�g�, a few dollars a week for many years)� A related tool could be the use of 
“micro” rewards� A micro rewards program would seek small bits of seemingly 
inconsequential information� The idea is that the information requested would 
be so innocuous that it would not cause the informant any of the concern about 
potential disruption to his life that might result from giving up more-significant 
information� For instance, how many cars pass a given intersection in a given 
day? When was the last time you saw somebody in the village you did not know? 
The key to this program is the relative anonymity of the rewarding party’s in-
volvement in the program and restricting the requests to very low-level, seem-
ingly innocuous information� The downside to this model is the possible flood 
of information, much of which will be useless�
On this point, a relevant case study concerns a competition that the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored in 2009� DARPA was 
interested in exploring how social networking can be applied to solving prob-
lems� For the competition, it required participating teams/individuals to find “10 
8-foot balloons moored at ten fixed locations in the continental United States�”73 
Just before the competition began, the balloons were floated surreptitiously at 
random locations in nine states� The winning team found all ten balloons in less 
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than nine hours� Its performance beat that of the other four thousand participat-
ing teams so roundly that it shocked DARPA, which had scheduled the competi-
tion to last two weeks�74
This case study is interesting and relevant for two reasons� Critical to the 
winning team’s success was its ability to work through thousands of tips in an 
extremely short period� Over the course of the competition, the four thousand 
teams’ social networks were churning out significant amounts of information; 
indeed, many of the teams engaged in disinformation campaigns intended to 
mislead other teams� Despite this, the winning team was able to parse all the 
information coming in and separate the quality information from the useless or 
misleading�75 This demonstrates that there is a mechanism that can be applied 
to a problem set such as this, allowing the user to evaluate lots of small bits of 
information and identify the valuable ones�
Furthermore, the DARPA competition itself could provide a model for re-
wards programs� The key to the winning team’s success was its incentive struc-
ture� DARPA offered a total of forty thousand dollars in prize money� The win-
ning team allocated this evenly among the ten balloons, giving each a “value” of 
four thousand dollars� Two thousand dollars went to the person who found each 
balloon� This was hardly unique; most other participating teams offered some 
reward for finding balloons� What set the winning team apart is that it then gave 
one thousand dollars to the person who had referred the balloon finder to the 
team’s website (if there was no referral, the finder received two thousand dollars 
and the other two thousand dollars went to charity)� Then the team gave five 
hundred dollars to the person who referred the referrer, $250 to the person who 
referred that person, and so on�76
This diffuse incentive structure essentially propagated itself over existing so-
cial networks: people were incentivized to get as many friends working for the 
winning team as possible� The speed with which this propagated itself is remark-
able� Each of the five members of the team sent out an e-mail explaining the com-
petition and the incentive structure� Within forty-eight hours, team members 
had five thousand people signed up to assist them�77 This likely could be repli-
cated to address any discrete problem or pursue any piece of information� While 
networked computers, e-mail, and websites make this incentive structure easier 
to manage and propagate, it could be done in the absence of computers through 
phone networks or even word of mouth� The British rewards-for-information 
program employed a similar model, paying members of the public a cash reward 
for assisting terrorists in surrendering�
The minimized-profile rewards model is not without its downsides� Substan-
tially increasing the number of rewards paid greatly complicates management of 
the program� Rewards must be tracked and paid� Regardless of the sophistication 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   14 8/7/17   11:58 AM
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/7
 F O R D  1 1 5
of the algorithm used to sort the data, each piece of the data would have to be 
entered into the system� Further, providing small payments over a long period 
creates an ongoing concern for the safety of the informant�
Maximizing the Reward Package. A program that minimizes the reward profile 
seeks to satisfy an informant’s need for security by keeping the reward clandes-
tine� An alternative model would address this need by maximizing the reward� 
Maximizing does not refer to the dollar value of the reward; as noted above, 
money alone rarely satisfies a person’s psychological needs, and may have the op-
posite effect� Rather, maximizing refers to a program that creates award packages 
that, along with providing monetary rewards, also ensure the informant’s safety�
In a rare congressional hearing on RFJ, Representative Brad Sherman noted 
that after giving the United States information, some informants “might find 
their country of origin to be a dangerous place�”78 He asked DOS’s Robert A� 
Hartung whether the department has the authority to provide visas as part of the 
reward� After some back-and-forth, Sherman summed up the issue: “But if we 
really provided the fine print on the Web site the way you would in a securities 
offering, we would have to asterisk and say whether or not we help you avoid 
death is subject to our sole determination as to whether you are in danger[;] and 
whether or not we can let you live in the United States, even if we think that is 
necessary for your protection, is subject to the determination of other agencies�”79
The most obvious maximized rewards package would combine a cash award 
with the guarantee of a new identity and permanent residency in another loca-
tion� The RAND report on the Chieu Hoi program found that one of the major 
deficiencies of the program was a failure to “aid [defectors’] reintegration into 
South Vietnam�”80 While informants today are relocated in some instances, a po-
tential informant may not know this, or may not want to entrust his safety to the 
bureaucratic vagaries of the rewards system� Thus, the State Department should 
advertise the possibility of visa packages, citizenship, and similar benefits�
Further, the broader the incentive package, the more psychological needs it 
will fulfill� For instance, money and moving expenses may satisfy an informant’s 
physiological and safety needs, but accepting them obliterates the fulfilling of 
needs that his family and community currently perform� Moving the family with 
the informant satisfies a portion of the informant’s needs, but fails to address 
needs that the community satisfies (a sense of belonging, self-esteem, respect, 
etc�)� A maximized reward would protect the informant and his immediate fam-
ily, plus his extended family, his close friends, or both� For example, rather than 
paying a ten-million-dollar reward and moving five people, the rewards package 
might pay five million dollars and move a dozen people� The greater the chance 
that an informant can live safely with his family and friends, the greater the 
chance the informant will consider coming forward�
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Implications for the Commander
While commanders on the ground have no control over the structure or adminis-
tration of DOS’s RFJ program, they should be aware of the program’s existence—
and its limitations� Commanders may well find themselves in circumstances in 
which they are recommending a reward from RFJ� Further, DoD regulations 
require coordination between DOS and the combatant commanders on rewards 
programs�81
Combatant command staffs should structure their rewards programs to al-
low for minimized-profile rewards� Commanders on the ground should think of 
ways to minimize rewards’ profiles while considering the various negative aspects 
of the rewards-for-information programs� Finally, all users of the DoD rewards 
program should track rewards given and information provided rigorously so the 
effectiveness of a program can be measured objectively�
Rewards programs plainly have a role in a counterterrorism fight� The British 
program in Malaya provides a powerful example of a dynamic rewards program, 
one carefully constructed to target the motivation of the targeted individuals� 
Several factors contributed to the success of the British program, foremost a keen 
understanding of the motivational and cultural components of the program and a 
willingness to adapt the program continually to changing circumstances�
The U�S� rewards programs have tremendous potential� They are firmly es-
tablished, well organized, and well funded� It is also clear that rewards can yield 
information leading to the capture of terrorists� Where programs focus on “suc-
cess” rather than effectiveness, however, their full potential is left unrealized� 
All rewards programs would benefit from objective evaluations and functional 
definitions of success that take into account the benefits and costs of a given 
program� The work that psychologists have produced since the 1970s provides a 
useful model from which to construct a better rewards program—or, at a mini-
mum, a good place to begin the conversation on how best to employ rewards to 
catch more terrorists�
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